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Abstract
Moving from a critical reading of Hannah Arendt’s view of the relationship between 
truth and politics, this essay reframes the relationship between post-truth and politics 
within contemporary democracies, where a) truth acquires the same status of radical 
immanence as neoliberal governmentality and the same status of equivalence and ex-
changeability as commodities and the market, b) the imperative of transparency re-
defines the public sphere, c) the theatre of representation transforms into the set of 
presentification, without any border between the visible and the invisible, the sayable 
and the unsayable. Within such a framework the parresiastic practice of saying one’s 
own truth must be reconsidered, alongside and beyond the foucauldian proposal, as a 
relational and political practice rather than an individual and ethical style of life. 
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Post-truth, Neoliberalism, Representation, Transparency, Parrhesia. 
Resumen
Partiendo de una lectura crítica de la perspectiva de Hannah Arendt acerca de la 
relación entre verdad y política, este ensayo redefine la relación entre posverdad y políti-
ca dentro de las democracias contemporáneas, donde a) la verdad adquiere el mismo 
1 Reception date: 1st March 2019; acceptance date: 22th March 2019. This article develops the text of two lessons held by 
the author at Ohio State University, US, and Miami University, Oxford, US, in the spring semester of the academic year 
2016-2017. 
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estatus de inmanencia radical de la gubernamentalidad neoliberal y el mismo estatus de 
equivalencia e intercambiabilidad de las mercancías y del mercado, b) el imperativo de 
la transparencia redefine la esfera pública, c) el teatro de la representación se transforma 
en el escenario de la presentificación, sin ninguna frontera entre lo visible y lo invisi-
ble, lo decible y lo indecible. Dentro de este marco, la práctica parresiástica de decir la 
verdad propia de cada cual debe ser reconsiderada, junto con y más allá de la propuesta 
foucaultiana, como una práctica relacional y política más que como un estilo de vida 
individual y ético.
Palabras clave
Posverdad, Neoliberalismo, Representación, Transparencia, Parresia.
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1. In a famous essay written in 1967, Hannah Arendt talks about the relation be-
tween truth and politics: an old and complicated conflict, she writes, which cannot 
be considered “by simplification or moral denunciation” (Arendt, 2007, p. 229). “Lies 
– she writes – have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of 
the politician’s or the demagogue’s but also of the statesman’s trade” (Ivi, p. 227); and 
“if we conceive political action in terms of the means-end category” (Ivi, p. 228), we 
can easily understand why not only common sense, but also eminent philosophers 
like Hobbes or Machiavelli have always considered lies as bad means but which can be 
necessary to accomplish the good end of a stable government. The point, for Arendt, 
is not this; neither it is an unavoidable degree of secrecy which is necessary to protect 
the State reason, nor is the ancient conflict between politics and the philosophical or 
transcendent truth. In our secularized societies, where truth has lost every transcen-
dental status and attributes, the point is rather the conflict between political power 
and what Arendt names factual truth – that is, the “modest verities,” as she names 
them, concerning undeniable facts and events that happened in the past or occurring 
in the present (Ivi, p. 231). These factual truths are the politically most relevant ones;. 
and it is precisely this kind of factual truth, which should be shared by common sense 
as undisputable, that political power invalidates, not by countering it with lies or de-
liberate falsehoods but simply by reducing it to a disputable opinion. What is at stake 
in this case, Arendt emphasizes, is not only the truth concerning this or that event, 
or “the perhaps inevitable tension between two ways of life within the framework of 
a common and commonly recognized reality”, but “this common and factual reality 
itself ” (Ivi, p. 236-237). And what is mostly worrisome is that this kind of truth’s 
manipulation is easier, and more frequent, in democratic regimes than in totalitarian 
ones, in as much as democracy is grounded on pluralism and freedom of speech, and 
democratic consensus is made by the public opinion.
When speaking of truth, facts and opinions Arendt is less ingenuous than one 
could think. Differently from many contemporary thinkers and journalists, who 
invoke a clear line between “facts” and “opinions”, she knows very well that facts 
and opinions are not clearly separable; and differently from many demagogues who 
today invoke the “transparency” – I’ll come to this word later – of facts and truth 
against the “opacity” of power, she knows well that both facts and truth are nei-
ther transparent nor evident, both being often, on the contrary, rather uncertain 
and opaque in themselves. This is precisely the sharpest point of her analysis: facts, 
opinions and factual truth belong to the same realm of contingency, which is in turn 
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the same realm of politics; and this common ground is the reason why the conflict 
between truth and politics is so acute and, in a certain sense, unsolvable. It is again 
this common ground that allows power to manipulate factual truth not by means of 
the traditional lie - which is “directed to the enemy, is meant to deceive only him” 
and is aimed to change only a single particular of the context, “tearing a hole in the 
fabric of factuality”- but by means of modern manipulation, which is directed to the 
people, needs self-deception by power, and “requires a complete rearrangement of 
the whole factual texture, that is, the making of another reality” (Ivi, p. 253). Such a 
“re-making of reality” is possible, for Arendt, thanks to those whom she names “the 
image-makers”, that is, those who are appointed to script and choreograph power’s 
narrative – as we would say today – with the complicity of the mass-media system. 
But we must add that this remaking of reality through the making of images implies, 
and is the result of, the very structure of capitalistic societies. It is worth noticing 
that in the same year in which Arendt published Truth and politics, Guy Debord 
came out with his The Society of the Spectacle, where he defined the spectacle as “a 
social relation between people that is mediated by images” (Debord, 2014, p. 2) and 
connected the form (and the fetishism) of the image to the form (and the fetishism) 
of the commodity (Ivi, p.14). This entails paramount consequences for the destiny of 
both truth and experience: the society of the spectacle, where “everything that was 
directly lived has receded into a representation”(Ivi, p. 2), “obliterates the boundaries 
between true and false by repressing all directly lived truth beneath the real presence 
of falsehood maintained by the organization of appearance” (Ivi, p. 116). Crucially 
for what we are going to say at the end of this essay, Debord links therefore the end 
of truth to the end of experience: the society of spectacle erases both the objective 
and the subjective truth. As he will conclude twenty years after, in his Comments to 
the Society of the Spectacle, truth “has almost everywhere ceased to exist or, at best, 
has been reduced to the status of pure hypothesis”, while what is false has become 
“unanswerable”(Debord, 1998, p. 9).
Arendt, anyway, was less apocalyptic than Debord, and still gave truth a chance. She 
saw in fact that in its conflict with factual truth, political power can’t take its victory for 
granted, for two reasons: first, because facts are at least more enduring and less transi-
tory than power, so that factual truth can survive power’s attacks; second, and most in-
terestingly, because power’s pretension of substituting reality with images and narratives 
makes it more and more unstable and unreliable. Arendt, in other terms, saw that lies 
are often a screen for power’s weakness. 
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I’ll come back later to this crucial point. But let me underline here that the whole 
of Arendt’s reasoning aims to focus on the unsettling contiguity between totalitarian-
ism and democracy in treating truth and lie as a function of consensus. Arendt wrote 
Truth and politics to reply to the controversies raised by the publication in “The New 
Yorker” of her reporting of the Eichmann trial, where she had outlined her thesis on 
“the banality of evil” and pointed to the European Jewish Councils’ responsibilities 
for the Jews’ deportations; but surely that controversy was also an occasion to re-
consider the thin line that distinguishes democracy from totalitarianism in the use 
of truth and lie, as well as the possibility that the totalitarian solution survives, as a 
latent temptation, in democracy. In fact it is not surprising that the question of truth 
comes out again now that our democracies, both in Europe and the US, are haunted 
by the return of the totalitarian specter, which is reappearing with the multiple faces 
of authoritarian governments, populist parties, charismatic leaders, manipulation and 
conformism of the public opinion. At the peak of the global triumph of democracy 
against the totalitarian regimes of the past century, democracy must paradoxically 
deal with the same problems that led to the ruin of its historical enemy. Nevertheless, 
it would be Arendt herself to recommend us the maximum caution in analyzing this 
paradox. Nothing could be more misleading, in fact, than speaking too much airily 
of “new fascism” or “new totalitarianism” when confronting the unkept promises, or 
the failed premises, of neoliberal democracy in our countries, where the problem is 
not repression, like in totalitarianism, but a sort of perversion of freedom (Foucault, 
2008; De Carolis, 2017; Melmann, 2005). As often happens in history, the same things 
return; but they return both by repetition and difference. And this is the case also for 
the relation between truth and politics, which shows up again today as the relation 
between post-truth and (post-)politics.
2. Speaking of truth, we could begin taking seriously the truthfulness of the lan-
guage and therefore asking what is the exact meaning of the word “post-truth” that was 
selected as the “word of the year” 2016 by the Oxford Dictionary, and hence was enthu-
siastically included in the political and media language all over the world. As in other 
cases, here the prefix “post” seems to mean not “after” but rather “beyond”. It seems to 
suggest therefore that we are no longer living, to use Foucault’s terms, under a true/false 
regime, but rather – so to say – under a neither true/nor false regime: that is, a social and 
cognitive regime, in which truth doesn’t matter, neither does consequently any struggle 
for or in the name of truth. If so, the current situation appears quite different from that 
Ida Dominijanni  POST-TRUTH POLITICS AND INDEBTED SOVEREIGNTIES
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   81 28/05/20   12:11
82
Soft Power          Volumen 6, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2019
described by Hannah Arendt. She referred to a secularized society, in which the reli-
gious and transcendent truth has vanished, but the factual truth, as we saw, still matters 
and is still at stake in many political conflicts. In a post-truth time, on the contrary, the 
struggle for truth is no longer necessary, as truth itself becomes unnecessary, volatile, 
replaceable. One could say, in other terms, that in contemporary democracies truth ac-
quires the same status of radical immanence which is proper to neoliberal governmen-
tality, and – as Debord already saw – the same status of equivalence and exchangeability 
which is proper to commodities and the market.
Nevertheless, the Oxford dictionary’s definition of post-truth is far different from 
this one. According to the dictionary, in fact, post- truth is “an adjective defined as re-
lating or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping 
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief ”. It is well known that this 
definition was largely influenced by two relevant political events, the British referendum 
on Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as President of the US: in both cases, the 
victory rewarded a campaign based more on clamorous lies, manipulation, sensational-
ism, fake news and falsified data than “objective facts”. But, if a definition must be valid 
also beyond the context from which it originates, the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of 
“post-truth” raises a number of problems.
First, it seems to establish a clear-cut and hierarchical separation between objec-
tive and subjective. Second, bestows upon to facts an indisputable objectivity, which 
Hannah Arendt, as we saw, already problematized more than half a century ago. 
Third, it considers emotions only as an unreliable factor of public life, in so doing 
revealing a sort of nostalgia for a politics based on objectivity and rationality versus 
a politics of subjectivity and emotions. It goes without saying that this definition of 
post-truth concerns politics, but over all, to be more precise, media-politics, the most 
relevant producer of truth and untruth being nowadays the mass-media system. But 
it’s worth noting that the whole debate around post-truth politics assumes, implicitly 
or explicitly, that the main culprit of the crime of post-truth is the Internet, and sig-
nally the social networks, as if the television and the newspapers were quite immune 
from the problem. In the aftermath of the Oxford Dictionary’s selection, for example, 
the Italian President of the Antitrust Authority proposed all European countries pro-
vide themselves with a network of public agencies “against the fake-news on the web”. 
Aside from the suitability and the efficacy of this proposal, one could ask: why only 
on the Web? Is perhaps the nostalgia for a politics without emotions also a nostalgia 
for a world without the Web?
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3. This kind of nostalgia is the same that all over Europe inspires today all-too-quick 
judgments against the so-called populisms which are increasing everywhere and disturb 
the “rational” functioning of representative democracy. We see a very large and hetero-
geneous range of groups, movements, parties, mostly but not exclusively right-wing, 
which share a number of traits in common: the rallying cry of the virtues and authentic-
ity of the people against the immorality and corruption of the political, economic and 
intellectual élites; the invocation of popular sovereignty and direct democracy against 
the mediations of constitutional and representative democracy; the xenophobic hos-
tility toward refugees and immigrants; a deep-seated suspicion of, or outright struggle 
against the political and economic consolidation of the European Union; a language 
full of discontent and resentment, anger and cynicism; and yes, the instrumental use 
of sensations and emotions, first of all the fear of the “others” and the hostility toward 
refugees and migrants, alongside the diffusion of false data and fake news aimed to 
discredit the enemy of the moment. The nostalgic evocation of truth and political ra-
tionality is fully comprehensible in the face of this “irrational” situation, even more 
when - like in Italy and in the US - the populist rhetoric gains power and rules the 
state. But nostalgia is not helpful for understanding what is really happening, and what 
is at stake, in contemporary western democracies, where anger and resentment don’t 
come from nothing: they are born at the crossing between the endless crisis of political 
representation and frustration about the unkept promises of globalization and neolib-
eralism, which thirty years ago announced an era of freedom and prosperity and since 
then have been producing more and more inequalities and hierarchical exclusions. One 
should not be surprised if this contradiction reproduces today the same ressentiment 
that Fridrich Nietzsche described in 1887 as addressed against those who are fortunate 
and happy (Nietzsche, 2012, p. 14), and that is now addressed against the establish-
ment and whatever is perceived as the establishment’s truth. Rather, one could ask why 
this widespread emotional condition of frustration doesn’t take other directions than 
victimization and recrimination, or why, and based on which kind of people’s identifi-
cations, it leads to “irrational” political choices like voting for candidates who belongs 
to the same establishment that it blames. But this is exactly the point: can we expect a 
“rational” political behavior by citizens who are moved by “irrational” emotions which 
in turn are produced by an “irrational” social condition? 
As we know from psychoanalysis and feminist theory, the figure of the neutral, 
abstract and rational individual has always been a false presupposition of the liberal 
tradition: it is not the natural precondition, but an artificial construction of the 
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modern narratives of the social contract, which in turn is grounded in the separa-
tion between the private sphere - that is, the realm of family, passions, feeling and 
emotions - and the public sphere - that is, the realm of politics and rationality (Pul-
cini, 2001). Therefore, the Indian writer Pankaj Mishra is absolutely right when he 
reproaches the progressive and leftist ideology for remaining attached to the liberal 
figure of the modern rational citizen without anchoring thought in the matters of 
the soul (Mishra, 2017). But this attachment is all the more incomprehensible in our 
times, when that figure – this is the point – has been dismissed by neoliberal rationale, 
which performs today’s political anthropology by demolishing every border between 
public and private sphere, and by engaging for its ends not only the rational but also 
the emotional sphere of individual life. 
 
4. As Michel Foucault explained in his course at the Collège de France on the birth 
of biopolitics, and as many scholars have developed in his wake, the proper quality of 
neoliberal governmentality is a specific co-relation between government and governed, 
and the specific mode of subjectivation implied by this co-relation: as a “government 
of self-government”, neoliberal governmentality needs and produces a subject who is 
actively and entirely involved in performing the system’s imperatives. (Foucault, 2008). 
That “entirely” must be understood as referring to the whole of the subject’s life: body, 
mind and psyche; rationality and sensitivity; beliefs and attitudes, emotions and desire, 
senses and sense-making are all subsumed in the capitalistic production of material and 
immaterial goods. Importantly, this subsumption is not achieved by compulsion, but 
involving the individual’s subjectivity in the activity he is required to perform. The neo-
liberal subject, in other therms, is not treated by power as a passive object: rather, pow-
er’s must lead him to do what he agrees to want to do, so that his desire coincides with 
power’s injunctions. Neoliberal governmentality is a sort of “Lacanian government”: the 
desire of the subject is the desire of the Other – whether the Other is the market or the 
political power. And this identification between the individual and the system’s impera-
tives is obtained through a performance/pleasure apparatus, that is, a double injunction 
which asks the subject to produce “even more” enjoying “even more” for this produc-
tion, according to a paradoxical equivalence between the duty of performance and the 
duty of pleasure. (Dardot & Laval, 2013). What’s relevant for us here is that this neo-
liberal mode of production and subjectivation also concerns the production of truth: 
neoliberal governmentality impinges on today’s truth/untruth regime, and complicates 
the question of truth and politics compared to the time of Hannah Arendt. 
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Focusing on this relation between the neoliberal reason and the current truth/false 
regime, the  Korean-German philosopher Byung Chul Han names society of transpar-
ency that society in which the imperatives of transparency substitutes truth and its 
constitutive rate of opacity with the illusion of a crystal-clear iper-information and 
iper-communication which gives visibility and public exposure to everything without 
enlightening really nothing, while increasing, paradoxically, “the foundamental opacity 
of the whole” (Han, 2015, p. 23). The imperative of transparency imposes itself through 
the same performance/pleasure apparatus we’ve just seen above: we all are called to 
perform it not as passive spectators but as active producers. It goes without saying that 
the overlapping of digital and traditional media plays here a crucial role. If the “verti-
cal” and authoritarian television has been working for almost a century in spreading 
from on high the principles of visibility, exposure and transparency, the “horizontal” 
and democratic social networks make us perform them from the bottom, “valorizing” – 
in a capitalistic sense – and profiting from our relationality, our narcissistic desire to be 
visible, our democratic right to express our opinions, our less democratic impulses to 
transform into a “like” or an insult every immediate emotion, affect and sensation, our 
pretension to look for truth without any expert’s mediation, and so on.
It is not a secondary effect of this auto-exploitation in using the Web and social net-
works that each of us spontaneously contributes with his/her own personal data to the 
collection of those big data that have become the first source for profiling, micro-target-
ing and other techniques aimed to reach and condition the electors, manipulating the 
entire electoral process, that is, the basic ritual of democracy. And it is sure as well that 
through the “transparency” of the Web every truth, mistruth and untruth can be pro-
duced and diffused without bumping into any obstacle. But here I would like to show 
some more general effects of the society of transparency on the contemporary forms of 
politics and on the current regime of truth-false.
5. The imperative of transparency entails enormous consequences for the profile of 
the democratic public sphere. It leads the transformation from the political theater of 
representation, with a stage and a backstage, a scene and an off-scene, a being and an 
appearing, a visible and an invisible, to the medial-political set of presentification (Ba-
zzicalupo, 2012, p. 106), where everything is on the stage, enlightened, evident, exposed 
to the other’s sight, and the off-scene, as well as the ob-scene, enters and occupies the 
scene. There’s no longer an invisible that must be brought to visibility and re-presented, 
no longer a secret to be protected, no longer an obscene to be concealed. And there is 
Ida Dominijanni  POST-TRUTH POLITICS AND INDEBTED SOVEREIGNTIES
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   85 28/05/20   12:11
86
Soft Power          Volumen 6, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2019
no longer any unsayable: everything can be said, true or false doesn’t matter. On this set, 
Guy Debord’s prophecy comes true: lies become unanswerable, and truth is reduced to 
the status of pure hypothesis. No wonder that such a set brings to prominence political 
leaders coming from the show-business or the tv-industry, as it has happened both in 
Italy and in the US. No wonder that one hears, from this kind of leader, that “alternative 
facts” exist, or that a young immigrant sex-worker is “Mubarak’s granddaughter”, as in 
Italy Silvio Berlusconi said of one of his favorite escorts a few years ago. And no wonder 
these kinds of power’s lies, which are more dangerous than the thousands of “fake news” 
we can daily read on the Internet, are held to be true by the people. 
This “transparent” set is in fact the ideal setting for the populist bond between the 
leader and his followers, one that is not grounded in representation of interests or ideo-
logical affinities but rather on conscious and unconscious identification of people with 
the Head. This is the reason why “irrational” feelings, suggestions, transfers can matter 
much more than any “rational” calculation of convenience and benefits: so that it can 
happen, for example, that poor people vote for a billionaire, trusting more in the mira-
cles of money or in the heroic narrative of the “self made man” than in a collective and 
political struggle for social justice. Or it can happen that immoral and illegal leaders are 
followed and praised not despite but because of their immorality and illegality, which 
work like a mirror for their followers’ unspeakable desires of transgression of the law. 
Or, once again, it can happen that overtly misogynist candidates and rulers are enthusi-
astically appreciated by men – and maybe women – nostalgic for a lost patriarchal and 
heteronormative order which is impossible, after feminism, to be reinstated. 
6. Let me better explain what I mean through the paradigmatic case of the twenty 
years’ long-lasting hegemony of Silvio Berlusconi’s regime in Italy, a country which 
is well known for its periodical invention of political models that often, and unfortu-
nately, have been exported elsewhere. In spite of the folkloristic and comical traits that 
made him famous all over the world, Berlusconi can be rightfully considered as the 
Italian way to neoliberalism, whose imperatives he embodied in his own biography, 
implemented in his post-fordist industries and spread all over the Italian mentality 
through his televisions. More precisely, he can be considered a case study of how 
a neoliberal and biopolitical governmentality can entrench itself, literally speaking, 
within the social body and its skin: in this case, by means of an ethical-aesthetic ap-
paratus based on the mobilization of senses, affects and emotions, surrounded by a 
massmedial reiterative sensationalism, capable of building a resistant common sense 
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   86 28/05/20   12:11
87
impenetrable to political rationality, as well as a consensus based on identification 
with the leader, his rich and glamorous style of life, his transgression of law, his prom-
ises to satisfy, more than material necessities, immaterial phantasies and desires – not 
least, the masculine desire of a powerful and enduring virility gratified by the com-
modification of female sexuality (Dominijanni, 2014). What I want to emphasize here 
regarding this apparatus is that it worked precisely by erasing the borders between 
private and public, visible and unvisible, true and false, sayable and unsayable, moral 
and obscene, and aiming to substitute every unpleasant side of reality with a sort of 
fake-reality, or if you like to re-write reality as a tv fiction: in Arendt’s terms, to ma-
nipulate factual truth with an incessant fabrication of images that are functional to 
the image of power. 
It would be interesting to note how two of these traits of Berlusconi’s governmental 
dispositif – the identification between the leader and his followers, the collapse of the 
border between sayable and unsayable – have shifted from Berlusconi’s regime to the 
different populisms which came in succession on the Italian political scene: first of all 
the 5Stars movement, which transferred the manipulation of truth and reality from a 
vertical and authoritarian medium like the tv to the horizontal and democratic one of 
the Web, pluralizing – so to speak – but not ending the production of uncertainty about 
true and false. This is only one of the many proofs that what I named above “the populist 
bond” persists in spite of the different contents that each populism heralds, no matter 
if it moves from the high of the government and from inside the establishment or from 
the bottom of the protest against the government and the establishment (Dominijanni, 
2017). But this matter would bring us too far. To end this conversation limiting it to its 
main argument, it is worth remaining on the case of Berlusconi as symptomatic of how 
a post-truth populism can not only arise, but also come to ruin, and, finally, end.
7. Looking at Berlusconi’s decline, in fact, one can realize that the strength of his 
sovereignty – the ostentation of his own person and his omnipresent icon on the 
transparent setting of hyper-visibility, the systematic substitution of reality with the 
liar’s narrative of fake-reality - revealed at least his Achille’s heel. The double paradox 
which entraps such a populist leader, in fact, is that the regime of transparency and 
hyper-visibility exposes his icon to the identification with it but also to its consump-
tion by his followers, making it as powerful as vulnerable. And the same post-truth 
regime that allows the leader to remake reality, enchains him to his false narratives 
and promises that cannot be realized and kept. In the times of debt economy, even 
Ida Dominijanni  POST-TRUTH POLITICS AND INDEBTED SOVEREIGNTIES
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   87 28/05/20   12:11
88
Soft Power          Volumen 6, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2019
sovereignty ends up as an indebted sovereignty, dependent on its creditors and per-
manently at risk of default. As Arendt foresaw, lies can be a mask, or a trick, for pow-
er’s friability.
That mask, moreover, can be suddenly torn off. It was what happened to Berlus-
coni, when the whole house of lies he invented to parry the discovery of the traffics 
of sex, money and favors that surrounded his system of power collapsed thanks to the 
truth claimed by his wife and some of the young women who had been involved in that 
traffic. Those women’s claimed truth was the unpredictable, parrhesiastic event which 
triggered Berlusconi’s end, showing his vulnerability and revealing the trick underlying 
his political as well as sexual regime: a fantasy of omnipotence covering a phantom of 
impotence.
That unpredictable event perhaps tells us something more general about the conflict 
between truth and post-truth politics. Beyond Debord, it tells us that there is a subjective 
truth, adherent to the real experience, that no post-truth regime or spectacle can deny 
nor silence, when the urgency to claim it coincides with the urgency of the desire for 
freedom. But it tells us also something else. That parrhesiastic event was possible in as 
much as those women claiming their own truth were publicly supported by other wom-
en who believed in what they were saying, and fought for their reliability against those 
who tried to discredit them as unreliable. Therefore we could say, following Foucault’s 
latest teaching (Foucault, 2009, Foucault, 2011), that parrhesia is a necessary practice we 
can and must perform against the current neither true- nor false regimes; but we must 
add, beyond Foucault, that it cannot be only an ethical and individual practice. It must 
be accompanied by a relational and political struggle aimed at giving authority to those 
who, in our democratic and egalitarian public sphere, are not actually authorized to 
speak and claim their subjective truth. This is what we can do, I believe, to affirm that in 
a post-truth democracy truth persists, against all odds, as a political wager.
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